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1 Introduction
$L\bullet ttioe\cdot Bas\epsilon d$ Cryptosystems. Since Ajtai’s semi-
nal results on the $ave\iota age- ca\epsilon e\prime wont$-case connection
oflatticc prohlems [1], the lattice-based eryptosystrms
have been studied. Ajtai andDworkproposed a public$\cdot$
key $cqptosyst\epsilon m[4]$ based on the worst-case hardness
ofunique sMtest vecter problem $(uSVP)$. Affir their
results, Rcgev proposed a cryptosystem [21] based on
the worst-case hartess of $uSVP$. In 2005, Rcgev in$\cdot$
$Poduc\epsilon d$ a cryptosystem R05 [22] based on the approx-
imation version of SVP and Ajtai introduced another
cryptosystem [3]. in the Rcgcv’05 $c\iota yptosyst\epsilon m$ md
the Ajtai05 cryptosystem, the size of the public kcy is
$O(n^{2})$ in the bare model and $\alpha n$) or in the common
$ref\sigma\epsilon nce$ string model. Their $\alpha yptosystems$ are more
suitable for $p\iota ac0cal$ use than the Ajtai-Dwork crypto.
system.
H vw , ffic W ] $oar$]$icationsoflattoe\cdot basd$
cryptosystems, $\epsilon xc\psi$ Micciancio andVadhan [18] md
Goldwasser and Kharchenko [11]. The former is a
zero-knowledge prooffor a gap voesion ofclosest vec-
tor problem $(GapCVP_{\gamma})$ , which wc $\iota ef\alpha$ as the MV
protocol. The latter is a $pr\infty f$ of $plaint\epsilon xt$ knowledge
fer the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem. Thus, we consider
another application for laUice-based cryptosystems, a
proofofkowledge on its secret kcy.
$Summ\bullet ry$. We propose $amoffidRq\epsilon v’ 05c\iota ypto-$
systm and inuodwr a $pr\infty f$ of knowledge on its se-
cret kcy in the common $\infty f\epsilon rnce$ sning (CRS) modeL
We consider the relation between the private kcy and
the public kcy as that between the message and the
$cod\epsilon wo\iota 4$ with the error in coding $th\bm{m}\iota y$. To cm-
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sbuct a proofof knowledge, we modify generadon of
ffie error This $mo\mathfrak{M}Calion$ admib a prover to prove
the knowledge of the $e\sigma or$ and the message based on
Stern [24]. Thus, we obtain a proofofhowldge on a
seeret kcy ofour cryptosystem.
Related Results. There already exist public-key
idrunCatiOn schemes based on latice and codmg
problrms. In 1989, Shamir showed an identiflcation
scheme based on permuted kmel problem [23]. Strm
proposed public-key i&ntflcation based on syndrome
decoding problem in 1996 [24]. Micciancio and Vad-
han introduced a zero-lmowledge proof with efficient
prover for $GapCVP_{\gamma}$ and discussed public $k\epsilon y$ iden-
tification schernes [18]. Rscently, Hayasi md Tada
showed public-kcy idenhflcaUon sehemes based on bi-
nary non-negative exact length vector problem (or in-
tegcr subset sum problem) [14]. Unfortuunately, it is
uniown whether their public kys can be used as a
public key of cryptosystems or not. We sbess that in
our identificaton schmes, infomabon for idrMca-
tion is indeed a public key ofcryptoeystcms.
Why can we not aPply the MV protocol to R05?
Before description of our idea, we briefly review he
key generation of R05 and explain why the same aP-
proach with Micciancio-Vadhm $\pi ot\infty o1[1\aleph]$ M8
fer our goal. (We abbreviate it to “tbe MV Protocol).
$\ln$ R05, $th\epsilon$ secoet kcy is s $\epsilon\Psi_{q}$ and he Public $k\epsilon y$
is A $=[a_{1}, \ldots,a_{m}]\in\Psi_{q}^{Xn\prime}$ and $b=lAs+e,$ $wh\epsilon re$
$e\in Z_{q}^{m}$ and each $c\infty rd\dot{m}$ate of $e$ is close to $0$. From a
coding-theooeucal viav, we can regard ${}^{t}A$ as a genera-
tor matrix, $s$ as a message, and $e$ as an error. Rrmark
that the length ofe is sbort. Hence, one would thinkwe
can aPply the MV protoeol to proofs ofknowledge far
a seeret kcy $s$ . However, we cannot aPply it in a naive
way. We explain more details.
We review the intUtion which is used in the
MV protocol. (See [18] for more details.) Let $(B, y, t)$
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be an instance of $GapCVP_{7}^{1}$ Let $B.(c, r)$ be an m-
dimensional hyperball whose center is $c$ and radius is $r$ .
In their protocol, the prover chooses a random bit $c$ and
a random vector $r$ firom $B_{m}(0, \gamma t/2)$ . The prover com-
Putes $m=cy+r$ mod $B$ and sends $m$ to lhe verifier.
The verifier sends a challenge bit $\delta$ to the Provcr. Note
that if $(B, y, t)$ is a YES instance then the ratio between
thc volume of $(B_{m}(0, \gamma t/2)$ mod $B$) $\cap(B_{m}(y_{7}’/2)$ mod
B) and that of $B(O, \gamma t/2)$ is at least $1/Poly(n)$ . If
$mE$ $(B.(O,7t/2)$ mod $B$) $\cap$ ($B_{n},(y,\gamma t/2)$ mod B) the
prover can flip a bit $c$ . The prover sends the proof
that $m$ is chosen from $B_{m}(cy, \gamma t/2)$ . Note that if
$(B, y, t)$ is a NO instance then $(B_{n}(0, \gamma t/2)$ mod $B$) $\cap$
$(B_{m}(y, \gamma’/2)$ mod $B$) $=0$. Therefore the prover can not
fliP a bit $c$ after a reception of the challenge bit.
Next, we consider applying their protocol to the
Rcgcv’05 cryptosystem, i.e., a proof of knowledge
that, on input (A. b), the prover knows $s$ such that
$b={}^{t}As+e$, where $e\in B_{m}(0, t)^{2}$ Note that alinear code
is $Z_{q}$-module in $Z_{q^{\hslash}}$ and a $la\iota\dot{u}ce$ is Z-module in $R^{M}$ .
$Th\epsilon ref\alpha e$, instead of reducing modulo $B$, we multiPly
a parity.check matrix Ii $of’A$ to the vector in $Z_{q}^{m}$ . Sup-
pose that $B_{m}(0,\gamma’/2)$ and $B_{l\hslash}(b, \gamma t/2)$ do not $int\alpha s\infty t$ .
Unfortunately, we cannot ensure t|\exists $\overline{3B}(0,\gamma t/2)$ and
$HB_{n}(b, \gamma’/2)$ do not intersect because the dimension
of $liZ_{q}^{m}$ is $m-n<m$. On such NO instance $(A, b)$,
the $p\iota \mathfrak{v}v\propto$ can cheat Ae verifier on whuich $hyPe\iota bau$
he chose $mR$)$m$. Hcncc the soumdnrss of the Proto-
col ails. Thus, we caoot aPply their Protocol to thr
Regcv’05 $cryp\iota osyst\bm{r}m$ in a straightforward way.
Main Idea. As sean in the abovc ParagraPhs, $wec\epsilon n-$
not aPPly the Protocol [18] to the $R\Leftrightarrow g\epsilon v’ 05$ eryPtosys-
tem $s\theta aightf\alpha wa\iota dly$. Let us reconsider multiPlying a
parity chack mabix H. Let $s\epsilon Z_{q}^{n}$ be a Private kcy and
kt $(A, b)$ be a public kcy, where $b={}^{t}As+e.$ MultiPly-
ing aParity-checkmatrix $H$ to the equation $b=/As+e$,
we obtain that Hb $=He$. The Prover should prove the
knowledge of $e\mathbb{R}t$ satisfies the quabon and each co-
ordinate of $e$ is in certain range. The difficulty to con-
struct the $pr\alpha 0\infty 1$ is to combine Protocols that Prove
sufficicncy of the quation and lying in the range.
Then, we modify a public key as follaws: The secret
key is $s\in Z_{q}^{n}$ and $s’\in\{0.1\}^{m_{1}}$ , whose Hamming weight
is $m2$ . The Public kcy is A $\in Z_{q}^{nx\prime n}$ and $E\in Z_{q}^{l\hslash\cross m\iota}$ and
$b=|As+Es’$ . In $s$ case, by multiPlying aparity-
check matrix $H$, we have that Hb $=HEs’$ . Translating
a mnix HE as a Parity cheek mamx, we have an in-
stance (HE, Hb, $ht_{2}$) and a witness $s’$ ofSyndrome De-
1 $(f,y,/)$ is a YES $ins^{\mathfrak{g}}I\iota^{\backslash }\epsilon$ if there $ex\dot{\iota}sl\w\in Z^{n}$ such that
$||lw-y||\leq t$ . It is a NO in$lance ir for any vector $weZ^{n}$ ,
$||fw-y||\geq\gamma t$ . Although they cmsider only full-rank lattices
in [I8]. we $consi4\epsilon rw1\alpha Ay$ $\hslash 41$-fank $kui\alpha s$. That is, an in-
stancc of $Oa\mathfrak{p}CW_{\gamma},$ consirs of $g$, which is a basis of a lattice
whose rank is $n.ycR^{n},\gamma\geq 1$ .
2 We abuse the notation $B_{m}(\cdot.\cdot)$ .
coding Problem (SDP).3 Since Stern proposed a proof
of knowledge for SDP in 1996 [24], we adopt it to
prove knowledge of secret key $s’$ .
The proof of knowledge for SDP $n\propto ds$ . a
statistically-hiding and $\infty mputationally- bind\dot{m}g$ com-
mitncnt scheme. Fortunately, ifA is chosen randomly
then the fimction $f_{A}$ : $\{0,1\}^{m}arrow Z_{q}^{n}$ : $m\vdasharrow Am$ is
a collision-resistant function based $\bm{0}$ the aPpmxima-
tion version of SVP [2, 10, 7, 15, 17]. Thus we cm-
Ploy that ftnction to develop a statistically-hiding and
computafio $y- bind\dot{m}g$ sning commitment scheme.
Our consffuction of a string commitnent is more
$s\theta aighfforward$ than DaengArd, P\’eersen, and Pfiz-
mann $[8, 9]$ and Halevi and Micali [13], which used
the universal hash fmctions.
We also show the security of lhe modified R05,
$mR05$ . Unfortunately, we need a stronger assump-
tion than the original one. The $st\infty ng\alpha$ assumflion
is the worst-cas$e$ hardness of certain learning problrm,
which is based on well-known problem Leaming With
Error (LWE).
OrganiZation. The rest of this chapter is \alpha ganizd
as follows. We briefly nole basic noUons and notaUms
in Section 2. We describe the Regev 05 cryptosystem
and our modified cryptosystem in Section 3. $N\epsilon xt$ wr
give our main results, a ptoof ofknowledge on a secret
key, in Section 4. Finally, we conclude in $S\epsilon c\iota ion5$ .
2 Preliminaries
Let $w_{H}(x)$ denote Hamming weight of $\iota$, i.e., the
numbff ofnonzcro elements in $x$. For an element $xe$
$Z_{q}$ we $defloe|x|_{l}$ as the integer $x$ if $x\epsilon\{0,1, \ldots, \lfloor q/2\rfloor\}$
and as the intcger $q-x$ otherwise. In other words, $|x|_{q}$
represents the distance of $x$ from $0$ in $Z_{q}$ .
Gaussimn and other distributions. The normal
$dis$qibution with mean $0$ and vaniance $\sigma^{2}$ is the
$disPibution$ on $R$ given by the dcnsity fUmction
$(1/\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma)\epsilon xp(-(x/\sigma)^{2}/2)$ . For any $dis\dot{m}h\dot{u}m\phi$, we
consider the distribution $\phi^{n)}$ obtained as follows: (1)
take $n$ samples $x_{1},$ $\ldots,x_{n}$ from $\phi$ independently and (2)
output $l(x_{1}, \ldots,x_{n})$. For a n-dimensional veetor $\iota$ and
any $s\succ O$, let $p_{s}^{(n)}(\iota)=\infty(-\pi||\iota/s||^{2})$ be a Ganssian
function scaled by a factor of $s$ . Also, $v_{l}^{\langle n)}$ $:=p_{l}^{(n)}/p$
is an n-dimensional probability density fmction. For
$a\in R^{+}$ the $disffiM\dot{u}m\Psi_{\alpha}$ is the dismbution on [$0.1$ )
obtained by sampling $Eom$ a nomal variable with
mean $0$ and variancc $\alpha^{2}/(2\pi)$ and reducing the result
modulo 1: $\Psi_{\alpha}(r)$ $:= \sum_{k\epsilon’l}(1/\alpha)\alpha p(-\pi((r-k)/\alpha)^{2})$ .
For $an$ arbitrary probabihty disaiMtion with density
fimcuon $\phi$ : $\prime rarrow R^{+}\underline{a}nd$ some intcger $q>0$, we
deflne its $di\Re\infty tizauon\phi$ : $4arrow R^{+}$ as the discrete
3 Syndran Decoding Problem: Given input $(Ey.m)$, where $Re$
$z_{2}^{(n-i.)}$ “, $y\subset Z_{\sim}^{\nu k},$ $m\geq 0$, find $\iota$ a ae ruch&At To $\overline{\sim}y$ and
Hamming weight of $\iota$ is exactly $m$.
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probability distribution obtained by sampling $\theta om\phi$,
$mul0pl\dot{p}g$ by $q$, and mcding to the closest integcr
$mod\bm{t}\circ q.Moreforma11y,\overline{\phi}(\iota):=\int_{dForintege\iota sm_{1}\geq m_{2}\geq 0,weeflne}(ji-+11//2z_{8_{et_{m}:=\{s’\in}^{\phi(xp_{X}}}))q:$
.
$\{0,1\}^{m’}|w_{H}(s’)=m_{2}|$ . For any $s\in Z_{q}^{m}$ , we define
$A_{\iota}$ obtained as foUows: (1) $Ch\infty se$ a random $v\propto tor$
a $\in z_{q}^{m}-\cdot(2)$Choose arandomelemmt $e\in Z_{q}$ according
to $\Psi_{\alpha}$ . (3) Outputs $(a, \langle a, s\rangle+e)$ . For any $s\in Z_{q}^{m}$ and
any $s’\in Set_{n_{\vee}},$ , we deflne $A_{s’}$ as the disffiMhon $m$
$Z_{q}^{n}x\eta\uparrow xZ_{q}$ obtained as foUows: (1) Choose a random
vector a $\in Z_{q}^{m}$ . (2) Choose a $\iota andomvec\infty re\in Z_{q}^{m\uparrow}$
according to $\overline{\Psi}_{\alpha/}^{\langle m_{1})}$ . (3) Set $b$ $:=\langle a, s\rangle+\langle e,s’\rangle$ and
$ou\phi ut(a,e,b)$ . We ako define $U’$ as the $dismbu0on$
on $z_{q}^{n}xZ_{q}^{\prime n,}xZ_{q}$ obtained as follows: (1) Choosr a
random vector $a\in Z_{q}^{n}$ . (2) $Ch\infty se$ a random $v\infty t\alpha e\in$
$Z_{q}^{m’}a\infty 0\iota d\dot{m}g$ to $\overline{\Psi}_{\alpha’ m_{-}}^{\langle n\prime\backslash )}$ . (3) Choose a random elements
$u\epsilon$a and output (a $e,u$).
We $\infty nsider$ the following leaming problems.
$D\epsilon flnitionl1$ (Leaming With $F_{A}\pi m,$ $LWh_{q.\overline{\Psi}_{*}}$ ).
Given $saI\Phi ls$ from A., find $s$ .
Definition 2.2 (Lcammg With Known $E\varpi\alpha s$.
$LWKE_{q.\overline{\Psi}_{*}})$ . Given parametcIs. $m_{1}$ and $m_{2}$ , ii
samples $gomA_{1},’$ , find $s$ .
We note that if thre $\epsilon xists$ an $Uv\alpha sa\iota y$ fl that
solves $LWE_{q,\overline{\Psi}}$. with non-negligible $\mu obabihty$ thcn
thcre nist8 an $adv\alpha saryfl’$ that solves $LWKE_{q,\overline{\Psi}}$.
with non-negligible probabihty. if $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ ncds $k=$
$poly(n)\epsilon ampl\alpha$ , then $fl’$ takes $k$ samples $(a_{j},e_{l},b_{l})$
ffim A.,’. $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}’$ inputs $\{(a_{l}, b_{i})\}_{l\approx 1\ldots J}$ to $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ and obtains
an output $\mathfrak{g}$ . $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}’$ outputs $s.$ Usin$g$ the rcproducibility
ofGaussian $disribu\dot{u}0\underline{n}s$, we show that the sum of $m_{2}$
samples $ac-\infty rd\dot{m}g$ to $\Psi_{\alpha/n},$: is, in fact, $dismbut\epsilon d$ ac-
$co\iota u\dot{m}g$ to $\Psi_{\alpha}$ , and hrce $\{(r_{j}, b_{l})\};=1,.4$ which $fl’$ com-
putes is indeed samples ffomA..
Givm two $\Psi ob\epsilon bihty$ density fmctions $\phi_{1},\phi_{2}$ on
$R^{n}$ , we define the statistical distance betwaen them as
$\Delta(\phi_{1},\phi_{2}):=\iota 2A_{n}|\phi_{1}(x)-\phi_{2}(x)W$ . A $\sin\dot{u}lar$ defi-
nition holds for $disc\iota\epsilon oe$ mdom variables. We some-
$\dot{u}mes$ abuse such notation, and use the same notation
$f\sigma$ two arbiaary $fimc\dot{u}ons$ . Note that the acaecptancc
$p\iota obabili\Psi$ of any algoriAm $m$ inputs ffom $X$ differs
$ffi)m$ its $acc\varphi tance$ probability on inputs fiom $Y$ by at
most $\Delta(X.Y)$ .
We say that $\bm{m}alg\alpha iehmD$ with oracle access is
a distnisher $ktw\infty n$ two disaibuoo if its ac-
oeptancc prohbihty when te oracle $ou\phi utssampl\alpha$
of he first $disffib\iota tion$ and when he orwle outpuls
samples of the sccmd distribution differ by a non-
naeligible ammunt.
Lmttices. An n.dimcnsional $lat\dot{u}ce$ in $R^{n}$ is the set
$L( b_{1}, \ldots,b_{n})=\{\sum_{i\Leftrightarrow 1}^{n}\alpha_{l}b,$ $|\alpha_{j}eZ|$ ofall integnd com-
$bina\dot{u}ons$ of $n$ linly $ind\varphi\epsilon ndmt$ vectors $b_{1}\ldots..b_{n}$ .
The $sequnc\epsilon$ ofvectors $b_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $b_{n}$ is calld a basis of
thc lattice $L$ . For more details on lattices, see the text-
book by Micciancio and Goldwasser [16].
We give well-known lattice problems, Shortest Vec-
tor Problem (SVP) and Shortest Independent Vecter
Problem (SIVP) and their approximation version.
Detinition 2.3 (ShoItest Vector Probleni. SVP). Given
a basis $B$ of a lattice $L$, find a non-zero vector $v\in L$
such that for any non-zero vcctor $x\in L,$ $||v||\leq||x||$ .
Deflnition 2.4 $(SVP_{7})$. Given a basis $B$ of a $la\iota\dot{u}c\epsilon L$,
find a $non- ze\iota \mathfrak{v}$ vector $v\in L$ such that for any non-zero
vector $\iota\in L,$ $||v||\leq\gamma||\iota||$ .
Definition 2.5 (Shortest Independent Vector Problem,
SIVP). Given a basis $B$ of a lattice $L$, find a sequence
of $n$ linearly indepcndent vectors $v_{1},$ $\ldots,v_{n}\in L$ such
that for any sequence of$n$ linearly independent vectors
$x_{1},$ $\ldots,\iota_{\pi}\in L,$ $\max_{j}||v_{i}||\leq\max_{i}||x_{i}||$ .
$DcAnition2.6(SIVP_{7})$ . Given a basis $B$ of a lattice
$L$, find a sequence of $n$ lmearly ind\varphi en&nt vectors
$v_{1},$ $\ldots,v_{n}\in L$ such that for any sequence of $n$ lin$-$
early independent vectors $\iota_{1},$ $\ldots,x_{n}\in L,$ $\max_{j}||v_{j}||\leq$
$\gamma mar||x_{;}||$ .
Codes. Let $F_{q}$ denote a field wilh $q$ elements, where
qisaprime power. $Aq\cdot\alpha y1\dot{m}\epsilon\pi codeCisal\dot{\bm{o}}-$
ear subspace of $F_{q}$ . If $C$ has dimension $k$ then $C$ is
called an $fn,k]_{q}$ code. A generator matrix $G$ fer a lin-
ear code $C$ is a $n$ by $k$ mabiX for which the columns
are a basis of $C$. Note that $C;=$ {Gm $|m\in F_{q}|$ .
We say that $G$ is in standard forn if $G=(\begin{array}{l}l_{1}r\end{array})$ . For
an $[n,k]_{q}$ code $C$, we deiine he dual code $C^{\perp}$ by
$isagen\varpi atormaaixinstandardformofthecod\epsilon C^{\perp}:=\{y\in P_{q}|f\varpi any\iota\epsilon C,\langle\iota,y\rangle=0|.IfG=(I_{l}f1$
,
$thenH=(\iota_{-g_{omthe\hslash ctthatHhastherightsizemd}}^{P})isagm\alpha^{\mathfrak{l}}at\alpha mamxoftk\infty deC^{\perp}Thi_{S}f\circ 11\circ WS^{-\ell}$
rank and that‘HG $=0$, which implies every codcword
Gm has $mn\alpha\tau oduct0$ with evcry column of H. In
$o\bm{i}\epsilon r$ words, $xEC$ if and only if ${}^{t}IU=0$ . Thus, we
call II a parity-check maffix. We note that, given any
generator matrix $G$ of the code $C$, we can efficiently
compute $C’ sg\epsilon n\varpi ator$ maPix $G’$ in standard form and
$C’ s\mu ity\cdot checkma\alpha ix$ H.
If $C$ is a $lin\infty$ code with a parity-check matrix $H$
then for every $\iota\in F_{q}$ we call ‘Hx the syndrome of $\iota$.
It is well known that the qucstion offiIdm the near-
est codeword to a vector (Nearest Codeword Pmblm,
NCP) is $NP\cdot Md$ even in apptoximation version [5]. It
is also difficult to find a word of a given weight ftom
its syndrome [6].
Dcflnitlon 2.7 (Symdrone C \subset k\lrcorner Umg Problrm, SDP).
Given a $\mu\iota ity$-check mamx $H\in q^{m}$ , a bin$a\iota y$
nonzero vector $y\in ae$ , and a positive integer $w$, find a
binary vector $x\in b^{n}$ with no more than $w$ l’s such that
${}^{t}Ik=y$ .
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Zero Knowledge and Proof of Knowledge. In this
section, we recall deflnitions and notations of zero
knowledge and $pr\infty f$ofknowledge.
Definition 2.8 (Auxiliary-Input Zero Knowledge).
An interactive $pr\infty f$ system $(P, V)$ for a language
$L$ is $\phi erfecstaustical/computa\dot{u}mal$ ) auxiliary-input
zero knowledge if for every probabilistic polynomial-
time machine $V$ and polynomial $\mu\cdot$), there ex-
ists a probabilistic $polynomial\cdot time$ machine $S$ such
that the msembles $((P, V^{*}(z))(x)$ } and $\{S(x,z)\}$ are
$oerfectly/sta\dot{u}stically/computaumally)$ indistinguish-
ablr on the set $\{(x,z):x\epsilon L.|z|=p(|x|)\}$ .
For a relation $R\subset\{0,1\}^{*}x\{0.1\}^{*}$ and $x\in\{0,1\}$ , we
deflne a set ofwitness $R(x):=t\nu|(x,y)\epsilon R$ }.
$D\epsilon 0nition2.9$ (Proof of Knowlegde). Let $\eta\in(0,1)$.
An inteIactive protocol $(P, V)$ with a prover $P$ and a
verificr $V$ is a proofof knowledge system with knowl-
edge emr $\kappa for$ a relation $R$ if the fouowing holds:
Completeness: For every common input $x$ for which
there exists $y$ such that $(x,y)\in R$ the verifier $V$
always accepts $int\epsilon\iota acnng$ with the prover $P$.
VaUdlty wlth error $\prime l$: There exists a polynomial-
time interacting oracle Turmg machine $K$ and a
constant $c>0$ such that for every $x\in\{0,1\mathfrak{j}$
such that $R(x)\neq\emptyset$ and for cvcry prover $P$
the following holds: $K^{r}(x)\in R(x)\cup t\perp$ } and
$Pr[K^{r}(x)\epsilon R(x)]\geq(p-\kappa)^{c}$, where $p\succ\kappa$ is the
probability that $V$ aecepts while interacting with
$P$ on common input $x$.
2.1 String Commitments
We $e\eta la\dot{m}$ the notation for comminnnt schemes
in the common reference sting (CRS) model. As-
sume that there exists a ffusted third party (TTP). Let
$Com_{(\cdot)}(\cdot;\cdot)$ be an indexed $\Phi nction$ which mapa a pair
of a message string and a random sbing to a commit-
ment sbing. First, TTP on input 1n outputs a random
$s\dot{m}ga$, which is tbe CRS and the index of the com-
mitnent fUnction. To $\infty mmit$ to a sffing $s$, thc sender
chooses a random smng $r,$ $\infty mput\propto c=Com_{a}(s;r)$,
and sends $c$ to thr receiver. To reveal $\infty mmiunmtC$,
the sender sends $s$ and $r$ to the receiver. The receiver
aecepts if $c=Com_{a}(s;r)$ or rejects otherwise.
Definition 2.10. We say a string commitnent scherne
$Com_{\{\cdot)}(\cdot;\cdot)$ is statistically hiding and $computa\dot{u}\infty ally$
binding if it has the following properties:
Statlstical Hiding: For any two smgs $s$ and $s’$ , the
statistical distance between $(a,Con4(s;r))$ and
$(a,Com_{a}(l;r))$ is negligible, where $a,r.r’$ are
random and independent.
Computationml Binding: For any probabilistic
polynommial-time machine $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$, if $a$ is randomly
chosen by TTP, then the probability that, given
an input $a$, A outputs $(s,r)$ and ($l$ , ) such that
$Com_{a}(s;r)=Co\mathbb{R}(J;r’)$ is negligible.
2.2 Subset-Sum Hash Functions and a String
Commitment Scheme
As cxplained in $S_{\vee}^{r}c\iota ion1$ we need a stng commit-
ment scheme to $\infty nsMct$a proofofknowledge ofa se-
cret kcy. We frst argue the famuily of subset-sum hash
fmctions and the smng $\infty mmiment$ scheme.
Let $n$ be a secwity parametcr (or a $\dim\varpi sion$ ofum-
derlying lattice roblems). For a prime $q=q(n)=$
$n^{(\chi_{1)}}$ and an integer $m=m(n)>n$ log $q(n)$, we define
a amily of hash fmctions, $\mathcal{H}_{q.m}=\{f_{A}$ : $\{0,1\}^{\prime Wu)}arrow$
$Z_{q(n)}^{n}|$ A $\in Z_{q(n)}^{nXm\langle n\rangle}$ }, where $f_{A}(x)=\$ mod $q(n)$ .
Originally, Ajtai [1] sbowed $\prime H_{q,m}$ is a family ofone-
way fimcuons under the assumption that SVP with
some polynomial $\Psi proxima0\{\bm{n}\ t\varpi$ is hard in the
worst case for suitably chosen $q(n)$ and $m(n)$ . It
is known that $H_{q.m}$ is indeed a family of $\infty 1lision-$
resistant hash Mctions for suitably chosen $q$ and $m$
by Goldrcich, Goldwasscr, and Halevi [10], Cai and
Nerurkar [7] and Micciancio [15]. Recently, Miccian-
cio and Regev showed $\prime H_{q,m}$ is a $a\dot{u}ly$ of collision-
resistant hash hnctions under the assumpton $SVP\alpha_{n)}$
is hard in the $w\alpha st$ case [17].
We cmstruct a statisticaUy-hiding and
$compu\iota a\dot{u}\bm{o}a\mathbb{I}y\cdot binding$ strin commitment scheme
based on the above hash fmctions. It is well known
that if there exists a collision-resistant hash fimctim
then there ex\’ists a statistically hiding and compata-
tionally binding string commitment scheme [8, 9, 13].
Their $cmsMction$ used universal hash fimctions
fer the statisticaUy hiding property. However, our
$cons\alpha uction$ do not use it, because if $m$ is $suffici\epsilon nUy$
large and a plaintxt $s$ is iandomized, As is $di\epsilon Plbutd$
statistically close to the miform distritution. To $\mu ove$
the statisucally-hiding property, we use Claim 2.12
below in [22].
We describe how to achieve a $s\alpha\dot{m}g$ commitment
schme in lhe CRS model. We first split lhe domam
$\{0,1\}^{\prime n}$ into two domain $\{0.1\}^{m/2}x\{0,1\}^{m/2}$ . The flrt
domain is used for imndomization. The secoud domain
is for message. We define $Com_{A}(s;r);=A\iota$, where
$x={}^{t}(r_{0}.’\ldots,.r_{m/2}, s_{1}, \ldots, s_{m/2})s=s_{1}..s_{m/2}r\Rightarrow r_{1}\ldots r_{m\rho}$
, and
Lemma 2.11. For a Prime $q=q(n)=n\alpha 1)$ and an
integer $m=m(n)>$ 10n log $q$, $q,m^{\dot{q}}$ cotlision \kappa
sistant anda trusted thidparty gives a random matmix
A $\epsilon Z_{q}^{nx_{m}}$ , lhen $Com_{A}$ is astatirically hidioe andcom-
putationally binding string conrmitment scheme in the
CRSmodel.
Proof. The $\bm{m}mputa\dot{u}onally$-binding $pr\varphi elty$ imme-
diately follows ffom the coUision-resistant property.
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Next, we cosider the statistically-hiding property. Us-
ing Claim 2.12 below, we have that with probabil-
ity exponentially close to 1 the statistical distance be-
$tw\infty n$ the distribution of $(A,Com_{A}(\alpha^{n/2};r))$ and that
of $(A, \bm{u})$ is negligible in $n$, where $r$ and $u$ are ran-
dom variables according to the uniform $dis\dot{m}bu\dot{u}on$ on
($0,1\}^{m/2}$ and $Z_{q}^{n}$ , respectively. Hence, for any two mes-
sages $m_{1},m_{2}\in\{0,1\}^{m/2}$ , the statistical distance be-
tween the $dis\dot{m}bu\dot{u}on$ of $(A,Com_{A}(m_{1} ; r_{1}))$ and that
of $(A,Com_{A}(m_{2};r\iota))$ is negligible in $n$ with probabil-
ity exponentially close to 1, where $r_{1}$ and $r_{2}$ are ran-
dom vriables according to the uniform disbbuuon $on$
$\{0,1\}^{m\prime 2}$ . This completes the proof.
Claim 2.12 (Claim 5.3, [22]). LetG be $affiiteAbel|an$
group and let $l=c\log|G|$ . For $c\geq 5$ , when choosing
1 elements $g_{1},$ $\ldots,g_{l}$ unifomlyfivm $G$ the probability
that the statistical htance between the unifom distri-
bution on $G$ and the distribution given by the sums of
random subsets of$g_{1},$ $\ldots,g$’ is more than $2/|G|\dot{u}$ at
most $1/|G|$ .
3 The Regev’05 Cryptosystem and Mod-
ffied Regev’05 Cryptosystem
3.1 The $Rlg\epsilon v05$ Cryptosystm
Regev proposed a lattiee-based cryptosystem in
2005 [22]. We $b\iota i\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} y$ review the Regev’05 cryptosys-
tem, R05.
Cryptosystem 3.1 (R05, [22]). Let $n$ be a security
parameter (or a dimension of the underlying $lat\dot{U}oe$
problem). Let $q$ be a prime and $\alpha$ be a parameter to
deflne the vmance of Gausaan disffl |ti0n such bt
$\alpha q>2fn$ . Let $m$ be an integr at least $5(n+1)\log q$ .
Private Key: $Ch\infty s\epsilon s\epsilon Z_{q}^{n}$ randomly.
Public Key: $Ch\infty s\epsilon a_{1},$ $\ldots,a_{m}$ $\in$ $Z_{q}^{n}$ mdomly.
Choose $e_{1},$ $\ldots.e_{m}$ according to the disnihrion
$\Psi_{\alpha}$ . Compute $b_{l}=\langle a_{i},s\rangle+e_{i}$ mod $q$ . The public
key is $\{(\iota_{i},b_{i})|_{l\underline{-}1,..m}$ .
Encryption: A $plaint\alpha t$ is $\sigma$ $\in$ $\{0,1\}$ . $Ch\infty se$
$S\sigma_{R}\{1, \ldots, m\}$ mdomly. The $ciph\alpha texl$ is
$(\Sigma_{i\epsilon S}a_{l},\sigma\lfloor q/2\rfloor+\Sigma_{\dot{\kappa}S}b_{j})$ .
Decryption: Let $(a, b)eZ_{q}^{n}xZ_{q}$ be a reeeived ci-
phrtcxt. $If|b-(a,$ $\iota\rangle$$|_{q}\leq q/4$ then decrypt to $0$.
Otherwise deerypt to 1.
The size of a public key and a privat\epsilon kcy aIe
$O$($mn$ log $q$) $=\alpha n^{2}$ log2 $q$) and $\alpha n$ log $q$) $=qn$ log $n$)
respectively. If $a_{1},$ $\ldots,a_{m}$ is the CRS, this is the idea
fiom Ajtai [3], the size of a public key is $O$($m$ log $q$) $=$
$O$($n$ log2 $q$). We summarize the security and deeryption
errors $ofR05$ .
Theorem 3.2 (Tbereom 3.1, Lrmma 4.4, and
Lemma 5.4, [22]). Let $a=\alpha(n)$ be a real nvnber
on $(0.1)$ and $q=q(n)$ a prime such that $\alpha q>2fn$.
For $m\geq 5(n+1)\log q$ , if there exists a polynomial
time algorithm that distinguishes between encryptions
of$0$ and 1 then there exists a distinguisher that distin-
guishes between A. and $U(Z_{q}^{n}xZ_{q})for$ a non-negligible
fraction ofallpossible $s$.
Next, assume there exists a distinguisher that distin-
guishes $A_{\iota}$ from $U(Z_{q}^{n}xZ_{q})$for a non-negligiblefrac-
tion of all possible $s$ . Then, there exists an efficient
algorithm that solves $LWE_{q,\overline{\Psi}_{l}}$ .
Finally, assume there exists an efficient (possibly
quantum) algorithm that solves $LWE_{q,\overline{\Psi}_{l}}$ . Then there
exists an efficient quantum algorithm for solving the
worst-case of$SVP_{(\chi_{n/\alpha)}}$ and $SlVP\alpha n/\alpha$ ).
Lemma 3.3 (Lemma 5.1, [22] $(Corr\infty tness)$). The
decryption $emr$ probability is at most $2^{-\alpha 1\prime(n\prime\alpha-))}+$
$2^{-f\chi_{n)}}$.
Remark 3.4. The $\infty duc\dot{u}on$ in Theorem 3.2 is quan-
tum. Therefore, the secumity of R05 depends on the
$worst\cdot case$ hardness of $LWE_{q,\overline{\Psi}}$. in the classical snse.
3.2 ModMed $R\epsilon gw’\propto$ Cryptosystem
We modify the Regev’05 cryptosystem to obtain a
new cryptosystem $mR05$ .
Cryptosystm 3.5 $(mR05)$. Let $n$ be a $s\epsilon cu\dot{n}q$ param-
eter (or a dimension ofthe $und\propto lying$ lattice problem).
Let $q$ be a prime and $\alpha$ be a $parmet\sigma$ to ddine the
variance ofGaussian distribetion such that $aq>2\sqrt{n}$.
Let $t_{\alpha}$ be a threshold swh that $Pr_{-\overline{\Psi}./n}[|e|_{q}\geq t_{\alpha}]$ is
negligible in $n$ (i.e., $t_{\alpha}=1X\alpha q\log n/m_{2}$ ) $.$) $L\alpha mk$ an
integ\mbox{\boldmath $\varpi$} at least $10(n+1)\log q$ . Let $ml$ and $m_{2}$ be inte-
gers such that $m_{1},m_{2}=poly(n)$ and $(\begin{array}{l}m_{l}n\prime\end{array})$ is exponential
in $n$ . Let $Set_{n’\iota.m_{2}}:=ts’\in\{0,1|^{m_{1}}\lceil w_{H}(\iota’)=m_{2}\}$ .
We need $4mm_{2}t_{\alpha}<q$ to ensure the $\infty r\iota umess$ of the
cryptosystcm.
Private Key: $Ch\infty ses\in Z_{q}^{n}$ randomly. $Ch\infty s\epsilon s’\in$
Set,$1,m_{-}$’ randomly.
Public Key: $Ch\infty s\epsilon\bullet l,$ $\ldots l_{l},$ $\in Z_{q}^{n}$ randomly and
$e_{1},$ $\ldots,e_{m_{1}}$ according to the $dis\dot{m}h\dot{u}on\overline{\Psi}^{m)}$
Let A $=[a_{1}, \ldots,a_{m}]$ and $E=[e_{1},$ $\ldots,e_{n}\alpha\prime n?$ .
Che& for any $i,$ $e_{i}’ s$ coordinates are at most $t_{\alpha}$
in the $s$mse of $|\cdot|_{q}$ . Compute $e$ $:=$ Es’. Let
$b$ $:={}^{t}As+e\in Z_{q}^{n}$ . The public kcy is $(A,E,b)$.
The seeret key is $\iota,s’$ .
Encryption: A plaintmct is $\sigma\in$ $\{0.1\}$ . Choose
$Sg_{R}\{1, \ldots,m\}$ randomly. The ciphertcxt is
$( \sum_{t\epsilon S}a_{i\prime}\sigma\lfloor q/2\rfloor+\sum_{kS}b_{i})$ .
Decryption: Let $(a, b)\in\Psi_{q}x\eta$ be a received ci-
$ph\pi t\epsilon xt$. $1f|b-\langle a,s\rangle|_{q}\leq q/4$ then decrypt to $0$.
Otherwise deaypt to 1.
For $\epsilon xample$, we set $q=\Theta(n^{3}),$ $m=10(n+1)1ogq$,
$\alpha=1/m^{2},$ $t_{\alpha}=n/\log n,$ $m_{1}=m$, and $m_{2}=\sqrt{m}$ . Note
thal with such parameters, we have that $4mm_{2}t_{l}<q$ .
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The size of a public key and a private kcy are
$O$(mn log $q+m\iota n$ log $q$) $=O$($n^{2}$ log2 q) and $O(n$ log $q+$
$m_{1}$ log $q$) $=O$($n$ log2 n) respectively. lf A and $E$ are
the CRSs the size of a public key is $O$($m$ log $q$) $=$
$O$($n$ log2 $q$). Note that, from a coding-theoretical view,
${}^{t}A$ is a generator matrix and we can compute a parity
check matrix $H$ such that, for any $s\in Z_{q}^{n},$ $H^{t}As=0\epsilon$
$Z_{q}^{m-n}$ .
First we see the $c\alpha\tau\infty mess$ of $mR05$ .
Lemma 3.6 (Correctncss). There exist no $dec” ption$
emrs in $mR05$ .
Proof. Suppose that $(a, b)$ is a vahd ciphertexts of $0$,
i.e.. $( a,b)=(\sum_{t=1}^{m}r_{i}a_{j},\sum_{1\frac{m}{-}1}r_{j}b_{j})$ for some $r\in\{0,1\}^{m}$ .
We have
$|b- \langle a,s\rangle|_{q}=|;\sum_{=1}^{\prime\hslash}r_{j}b_{i}-\langle\sum_{i=1}^{m}r_{i}a_{i\prime}s\rangle|_{q}$
$=| \sum_{i=1}^{m}r_{l}e:|q \leq| \sum_{i=1}^{m}e_{j}|_{q}\leq m|e_{j}|_{q}\leq mm_{2}t_{\alpha}$ ,
where $e_{l}$ is i-th $c\infty rd\dot{m}$ate of $e=$ Es’. Since we set
$4mm2t_{q}<q$, we obtain $|b-\langle a,s\rangle|_{q}<q/4$. Next
we consi&r the case $(a,b)$ is a vahd ciphertcxts of
1, i.e., $( a,b)=(\sum_{l=1}^{m}r_{i}a_{i}, \lfloor q/2\rfloor+\sum_{j=l}^{m}r_{i}b_{i})$ far some
$r\in\{0,1\}^{n\prime}$ . Similarly to the case $ofO$, we have
$|b-\langle a, s\rangle|_{q}\geq\lfloor q/2\rfloor-mm_{2}t_{\alpha}\geq q/4$
and we can decrypt correctly.
Combin$\dot{\bm{o}}g$ Lernma 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 below, we ob-
tain the folowing theorem on 8ecurity $ofmR05$ .
Theorem 3.7 (Security). For $m\geq 10(n+1)\log q$, if
there exists apolynomial-time algorithm $D$ that distin-
guishes between $enc$”$ptions$ of$0$ and 1 with its public
kay then there $\alpha ists$ a polynomial-time algorithm fl
that solves $LWKE_{q,\overline{\Psi}}$. in the worst case.
Lemma $3S$. For $m\geq 5(n+1)\log q$. if there exists
a polynomid time algorithm $D$ that distinguishes be-
tween encryptions of $0$ and 1 with its public $\emptyset$, then
there extsts a $dis$tinguisher $q$ that distinguirhes be-
tween A..’ and $U’$ for a non-negligble fraction ofall
possible $s$ and $s’$ .
We omit the $pr\infty f$, because the pmof is quite similar
to the $s\infty l\dot{m}ty$ proofin [22].
Lemma 3.9 (Average.case to Worst-case). Assume
there exists a distinguisher $D$ that distinguishes $A_{||’}$
fivm $U’$ for a non-negligiblefraction ofall possible $s$
and $s’$ . Then there exists an algorithm $y$ thatfor all $s$
and $s’$ accepts withprobability exponentially close to 1
on inputs from $A_{\iota},.$, and rejects with probability mxpo-
nentially close to 1 on inputsfrom $U’$ .
Proof. As similar to Regev’s proof [22], we prove the
lemma based on the following transfomation. For any
$t\in Z_{q}^{n}$ and any permutation $\pi\in S_{m}$, consider the fmc-
tion $f_{lr}$ : $Z_{q}^{n}xZ_{q}^{m}$‘ $xZ_{q}arrow Z_{q}^{n}xZ_{q}^{m_{1}}\cross a$ defined
by
$f_{tn}(a,e, b)=(n,\pi(e),b+\langle a,t\rangle)$ .
This fimction ffosforms the disnibution $A_{*}.$, into
$A_{+’.\pi(’)}$ . Moreover, it $gansf\alpha m8$ the dismbuua $U’$
into itself
Next we consider a random statistical test. Assume
that for $n^{\sim}’$ ffaction of all possible $(s,s’)$ , the aeccp-
tance probability of $W$ on mputs from $A_{W}$ and on in-
puts ffom $U’$ differ by at loest $n^{-c_{2}}$ . We constuct the
distinguisher $q$ as follows. Let $R$ denote the unknown
input distribution. (0) Repeat the $fo\mathbb{I}ow\dot{m}gk^{1+l}\dot{u}mes$.
(1) Choose a vecter $t\in Z_{q}^{n}$ and a permutation $\pi\in S_{m}$,
unifCrrnly at random. (2) Esumate $p_{R}$ , the acceptance
probability of $D$ on $f_{1},(R)$, by cauing $DT=\rho_{2+l}$
times. Let $x_{R}$ be the number of 1 in the outputs of $D$.
(3) Estimate $p_{U}$ , the acceptance probability of $D$ on
$U’$ , by calling D $T$ times. Let $x_{U}$ be the number ofl in
the outputs $ofD$. (4) $1f|x_{U}-x_{R}|/T\geq n^{-c:}/2$ then stop
and accept. Otherwise contnuc. (5) If the $po\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} m$
ends without aeceptng, stop and reject.
When $R$ is $U’$ , the probability that $|p_{U}-x_{U}/T|\geq$
$n^{-}\sim\prime 8$ is cxponcntially small by the Hoeffding bound
Since $f_{t\pi}(U’)=U’$, the probability $that|p_{U}-x_{R}\prime T|\geq$
$n^{-c_{-}}’/8$ is $\epsilon xponenuaUy$ small. Therefore, the accep-
tance probability $ofD’$ is ewonenrially close to $0$.
When $R$ is $A_{l},$’ for somc $s.s’$ . In each of the itera-
tions, we are $\infty nsid\alpha ing$ the dist-ril ution $f_{I},(A_{B}\cdot)=$
$A_{+W’)}$ for some uniformly chosen $t$ and $\pi$. Hence,
with probability rpmentially close to 1, in one of
the $ff^{|+1}$ iterations, $(s+t,\pi(s’))$ is such that the ac-
ceptance probability of $D$ on inputs fiom $A_{+’\wedge’)}$ and
on inputs \S om $U’$ differ by at lrast $n^{-c_{2}}$ . $\ln$ this
case, $\theta om$ the Hoeffdng bound, the probabihty that
$|p_{U}-x_{lU}/T|\geq narrow/8and|p_{R}-x_{R}/T|\geq n^{-c}-\prime 8$ is $\epsilon x$.
$Py$ gcr, aecepts with $r_{O}obbihty$
$\epsilon xpon\epsilon n0aUyclos\epsilon$ to 1.
Lemma 3.10 (Decision to Search). Let $n\geq 1$ be some
integer and $q\geq 2$ be a prime. Assume theie $\alpha ists$ an
algorithm $D$ that for all $\iota,$ $s’$ accePts with probability
exponentially close to 1 on $i’\varphi utsfvmA_{||’}$ andrejects
with $pmbabili\varphi\alpha\mu nennally$ close to 1 on inPltsM
$U’$ . Then, there exists an algorithm $q$ that, given sam-
$p$ $fvmA_{\iota},.$, some $ou$ $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ ’ w pm $bili\nu$
exponentially close to 1.
Proof. We only show hew $D’$ find the first coordinate
of $ss_{1}\in Z_{q}$ . For any $k\in Z_{q}$ , consider the following
$ffansf\alpha ma\dot{u}on$. Given a tmple $(\bullet, \epsilon, b)$ we output the
tuPle $(a+{}^{t}(l, 0, \ldots,0), e, b+lk)$ where $l\in Z_{q}$ is cho-
sen uniformly at mndom. This random \alpha an8fo\’eatim
takes $U’$ into itself Moreover, if $k=s_{1}$ then this trans-
$f\alpha maGon$ $0$ kes $A_{Z^{1’}}$ into itseff. Fimlly, if $k\neq s_{1}$
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then it $\alpha ansf\alpha\iota nsA,,$, to $U’$ . Therefere, using $D$, we
can test whether $k=s_{1}$ or not. Since there are only
$q<poly(n)$ possibilities for $s_{1}$ , we can try al of them.
Remark 3.11. The hardness of the worst case of
$LWKE_{q,\overline{\Psi}_{l}}$ implies the hardness of the worst case of
$LWE_{q\overline{\Psi}_{l}}$ . Note that it is unknown ifthe converse state-
ment holds. We also note that, fiom $\prime I^{\cdot}heorem3.2$, there
exists a quantum $r\epsilon ducuon$ from $LWE_{q,\overline{\Psi}_{\epsilon}}$ to $SVP\delta tn/\alpha$ )
and $SIVP_{l}\chi_{n/\alpha)}$ .
4 Main Protocol
Recall that we can mnsider’A as a generater matrix
from a codmg-thcoretical view and a parity-check ma-
trix $H$ is easily computcd. Informaly, if Alice wants
to prove that she has a secret kcy $\infty\iota res\mu nd\dot{\bm{o}}g$ to a
public key $b$ , it is sufiicient that she proves that shc has
an $\alpha ror$ kcy $s’$ such that HEs’ $=Hb$.
Definitlon 4.1 (Relation $R_{mR05}$). Let $(A,E,b)$ be a
public kcy of $mR05,$ $H$ a $prity- ch\propto k$ matrix of $A,$ $s$
a vector in $Z_{q}^{n}$ , and $s’$ a vector in $Z_{q}^{m_{1}}$ . We say that
input (A $H,B,b$) and witness $(s.s’)$ are in $R_{nR\bm{0}5}$ if
$s’\in Set_{m,,n_{2}},$ $As+Es’=b$, and HEs’ $=Hb$ .
Next, we descxibe the protocol for a pmofofhowl$\cdot$
edge for a secret kcy, which is mainly based on a proof
ofknowledge for SDP by Stern [24].
Protocol 4.2 (Protocol PSK). Let $P$ and $V$ be a prover
and a verifier respectively. The CRS is $A$, E. The com-
mon input is $b$ . The auxiliary inputs to the prover are
$s$ and $s’$ such that $b={}^{t}As+Es’$ . Let $Com(\cdot;\cdot)=$
$Com_{A}(\cdot;\cdot)$.
SteP Pl $Ch\infty s\epsilon$ a mdom permutation $\pi$ for
$\{1, \ldots,m_{1}\}$ and a random vector $y\in Z_{q}^{m_{1}}$ . Com-
pute $cl=Com$($\pi$ , HEy; $r_{1}$ ), $c_{2}=Com(\pi(y);r_{2})$
and $c_{3}=Com(\pi(y+s’);r_{3})$ . Srnd $c_{1},$ $c_{2},$ $c_{3}$ to $V$.
$SteP$ Vl $\nabla$ sends a random $chW\epsilon nge$ bit $\delta e_{R}\{1,2,3\}$
to $P$.
SteP P2 $If\delta=1,$ $P$ opens $c_{1}$ and $c_{2}$ (i.e., sends $\pi,$ $y,$ $r_{1}$ ,
and $r_{2}$ to $V$). If $\delta=2$. $P$ opens $cl$ and $c_{3}$ (i.e.,
sends $\pi,$ $y+s’,$ $r_{1}$ and $r_{3}$ to $V$). lf $\delta=3,$ $P$ opns
$c_{2}$ and $c_{3}$ (i.e., sends $\pi(s’),\pi(y),r_{2}$ , and $r_{3}$ to $V$).
$St\epsilon P$ V2 lf $\delta=1$ , received $\hslash,$ $y^{\sim},$ $r_{1}$ , and $7_{2}$ , check
the commitrmts $c_{1}$ and $c_{2}$ were crmct (i.e.,
$c_{1}=Com(\hslash.HEJ;r_{1})\bm{m}dc_{2}=Com(\pi(*y);\tilde{r}_{2}))$.
lf $\delta=2$, reeeived $\hslash,\tilde{\iota},\tilde{r}_{1}$ , and $\dot{r}_{3}$ , check that the
commibnents $c_{1}$ and $c_{3}$ were $\infty\varpi\epsilon ct$ (i.e., $c_{1}=$
$Com$($\hslash$, HEi–Hb; $\dot{r}_{1}$ ) and $c_{3}=Com(\pi(\tilde{\iota});\dot{r}_{3}))$.
If $\delta=3$, received $i_{1},$ $i_{2},$ $h$, and $\tilde{r}_{3}$ , check that
the comrnitments $c_{2}$ and $c_{3}$ were cerrect (i.e.,
$c_{2}=Com(\tilde{\iota}_{1} ; \tilde{r}_{2})$ and $c_{3}=Com(\tilde{\iota}_{1}+\overline{\iota}_{2};\tilde{r}_{3}))$
and t $w_{H}(\sim 2)=m_{2}$ .
Theorem 4.3. Interactive protocol ($P,$ $V\gamma ir$ a proof
of knowledge system with knowledge emr 2/3 for
$R_{mR05}$ . Moreover, the prvtocol $(P, V)$ is a statistical
zero-knowledge argumentfor $R_{\mathfrak{n}\iota R05}$ in CRS model un-
der the assumption that the worst case of $LWKE_{q,\overline{\Psi}_{\alpha}}$
and $SVP\alpha n$) $\dot{w}$ hard.
Proofofcompleteness. We omit the proof since it is
evidrnt.
We use Lcmma 4.4 below in [24] in the proofofknowl-
edge error.
Lemma 4.4 (Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, [24]). Assume
that some probabilistic polynomial-time adversary $P$
is acceptedwith $probabili\varphi$ at least $(2/3)^{r}+\epsilon$. $\epsilon>0$,
after playing the $iden\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} fiation$ protocol $r$ times. $nen$
there exists apolynomial-timeprobabilistic mochine $K$
such that outpuis the witness s’fiom the common input
or elsefiwls collisionsfor $\alpha e$ hashfnction with prob-
$abiTity$ larger than $\epsilon^{3}/10$.
The idea of Lemma 4.4 is folows: Assume that $P$
can output response to al $V’ s$ chalenges corrmtly. Let
$P’ s$ response to $V’ s$ challenge 1 be $\hslash_{1},\overline{y},\tilde{r}_{1,1}$ , and $\dot{\prime}\iota,2$ .
Let $P^{\cdot}s$ response to $V’ s$ challenge 2 be $\pi_{2},\tilde{z},\tilde{r}_{2,1}$ , and
$\tilde{r}_{2,3}$ . Finally, let $P^{\cdot}s$ response to $V’ s$ challenge 3 be
$\overline{\iota}_{1},\tilde{\iota}_{2},\tilde{r}_{3.2}$ and $\tilde{r}_{3.3}$ . Since al response are correct, we
obtain that
$c_{1}=Com(\hslash_{1},HEJ;\tilde{r}_{1,1})$ $=Com$($\hslash_{2}$. HEi-Hb; $\tilde{r}_{2,1}$ )
$c_{2}=Com(\hslash_{1}(\tilde{y});\tilde{r}_{1,2})$ $=Com(\tilde{\iota}\iota;’ 3,2\sim)$
$c_{3}=Com(\hslash_{2}(\tilde{\iota});\tilde{r}_{2.3})$ $=Com(2_{1+\tilde{\iota}_{2;\prime],3}}\sim)$
If there exists a distnct pair in the inputs of $\infty mmit-$
ment we find a collision Then, we assume there ex-
ists no distnct pair in $P’ s$ responses. Since $P$ is $a^{\wedge}\cdot-$
cepted, $w_{H}(\tilde{\iota}_{2})=m_{2}$ . From $c_{1}’ s$ equation, $\pi_{1}=\hslash_{2}$ .
$Comb\dot{\bm{o}}\dot{\bm{o}}g\pi_{1}=\hslash_{2}$ and $c_{3}’ s$ equations, we obtain
$\tilde{r}=\pi_{2}^{-l}(\tilde{\iota}_{1})+\pi_{2}^{-1}(\overline{\iota}_{2})$ . From $c_{2}’ s$ equation, we have
that $\overline{y}=\hslash_{2}^{-1}(\tilde{\iota}_{1})$ . Therefore, combining the above ar-
gument and $c_{1}’ s$ quation, we obtainHb $=HE(\tilde{\iota}-\tilde{y})=$
$HE\hslash_{2}^{-1}(\tilde{\iota}_{2})$ and a witn ess $\hslash_{2}^{-1}(l_{2})$ . Thus, we $ob\infty\dot{m}$ a
collision or a $wih\epsilon ss$ using $P$ .
Proofofknowledge emr with 2/3. Assume that
some probabilistic polynomial-time adversary $P$ in
Leinma 4.4. Using Lemma 4.4, we obtain $K$ in the
above. In Strm’s proof, be consider bin$aar\iota yyl\dot{m}\epsilon r$
codes. Although we play the protocol in q-ary linur
codes, we can apply $Stm’ s$ pmof to $q- a\iota y$ codes.
Note that, under tbe $ass\backslash mp\dot{u}on$ that the worst case
of $SVP\alpha n$) is hard, finding collision is hard [17].
Therefore if assume that $SVP\alpha_{n)}$ is hard in the
$w\infty\epsilon to$
case, we obtain a howldge erctractor $K$ .
Prvofofzero knowledge. Since Com is statisticaly
hiding, the simulator’s output the nanscript when the
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simulator did not $ou\Phi ut\perp can$ be statistically close to
the real transcript. We omit the detail of the
$simulator\square$
due to lack of space.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have proposed a modifled
Regev’05 cryptosystm $(mR05)$ and introduced aproof
ofknowledge on its seeret kcy.
At the end, we list up a few open problems: (1)
A $pr\infty f$ of knowledge on a secret key of the original
Regcv’05 cryptosystem (R05); mR05 needs stronger
assumption than one which R05 needs. (2) Relation
between LWE and LWKE; we have failed to show a re-
duction $\theta om$ LWE to LWKE. (3) Zero knowledge on
coding problms; As seen in Section ], the MV proto-
col co not apply to coding problems. Thus, we need a
direct $p\iota oto\infty 1$ for coding problems.
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